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1 Introduction
The largest corporate bankruptcy ¯led in the U.S., that of Enron in 2001, was preceded by
a string of disclosures about errors in and corrections to their ¯nancial statements.1 The
presence of such errors highlights the fact that market participants face two inter-related
problems when pricing securities based on ¯nancial statements. First, they must assess the
quality of the information contained in the ¯nancial statements. Then, they must actually
make projections about the future. The second is to actually make projections about future
cash °ows and to fold these projected cash °ows back into a value for the security. Even if one
assumes that accurate models are available for projecting cash °ows and valuing securities,
uncertainty about the quality of the ¯nancial statements can lead to pricing distortions and
ine±cient market allocations.
Several causes have been suggested for the current state of a®airs. Most important,
perhaps, are managers' tendency to in°ate stock prices for personal gain through deceit,
`cooking the books'- misrepresentations in ¯nancial reporting - and other unethical behavioral
practices, and auditors' failure to ful¯ll their role as independent gatekeepers. Currently, the
incentives driving auditors' behavior may not elicit unbiased reports. Auditors are paid by
the companies they audit which creates an inherent con°ict of interest that is endemic to
the relation between the ¯rm (the principal) and the auditor (the agent).
Unfortunately, remedying these problems is not simple. Prosecution and punishment may
not adequately deter wrongdoing, as intentional misrepresentation is di±cult to discover or
prove. Overhauling the regulatory structure and adding layers of supervision and monitoring
by the government would be ine±cient and socially wasteful. In addition, little can be
1As catastrophic as this event may have been, it proved to be only the beginning of a series of stunning revelations of
accounting irregularities by major corporations that were the darlings of Wall Street: Worldcom, AOL, Metromedia Fiber
Networks, Qwest Communications; the list goes on and on. The number of restatements keeps rising, from 50 a year in the
early 1990s to well over 200 a year in 2001.
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done in the short run to cultivate ethical personalities. Rather, the solution lies in market
mechanisms that eliminate the perverse incentives of gatekeepers, most notably the auditors.
We need an institutional mechanism that eliminates the con°ict of interest auditors face and
properly align their incentives with those of shareholders.
We present here a ¯nancial statement insurance mechanism that promotes improved align-
ment of incentives, and hence better quality audits. We show analytically that the introduc-
tion of ¯nancial statement insurance can signi¯cantly mitigate market ine±ciencies arising
from uncertainty regarding the quality of ¯nancial statements.2 The basic structure of Fi-
nancial Statement Insurance (FSI) can be described as follows (details may be found in
Appendix 2, based on Ronen (2002)). Instead of appointing and paying auditors, companies
would purchase ¯nancial statement insurance that provides coverage to investors against
losses su®ered as a result of misrepresentation in ¯nancial reports. The insurance coverage
that the companies are able to obtain is publicized, as are the premiums paid for that cov-
erage. The insurance carriers would then appoint { and pay { the auditors, who attest to
the accuracy of the ¯nancial statements of the prospective insurance clients. Those ¯rms
announcing higher limits of coverage and smaller premiums would distinguish themselves in
the eyes of the investors as companies with higher quality ¯nancial statements. In contrast,
those with smaller or no coverage or higher premiums will reveal themselves as those with
lower quality ¯nancial statements. Every company will be eager to get higher coverage and
pay smaller premiums lest it be identi¯ed as the latter. A sort of Gresham's law in reverse
would be set in operation, resulting in a °ight to quality.
Before addressing the economic consequences arising from ¯nancial statement insurance
and related procedural changes, we present arguments suggesting that a critical economic
2An analogy is the product warranty market. Grossman (1981) shows that managers use full disclosure of private information
to maintain the value of the product they sell. When managers do not disclose, buyers or investors discount the price to re°ect
their expectations of hidden information about low product quality.
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factor in the recent debacles was the misaligned incentives of the auditors. In particular,
a coincidence of circumstances created an environment within which the misaligned incen-
tives of the auditors brought about a disastrous failure in the gate keeping function and a
consequent misallocation of capital.
In the current social arrangement, auditors face a con°ict of interest. They are paid by
the companies they audit and look to the CEOs and CFOs of the same company to facilitate
their continued engagement. According to sound principles of corporate governance, auditors
are supposed to be the agents of the shareholders, but in practice, it is management that
hires the auditor. Although shareholders vote on management's recommendation of which
auditor to hire, the decision is in practice made by management. This arrangement creates
an inherent con°ict of interest for the auditor. It is the management of the company that
engages the auditor and ultimately pays for the services and hence determines auditing and
consulting fee structures to elicit actions, including opinions and assurances, that it desires
from the auditor. The risk of losing fees from a long-term audit engagement - even in light of
the limitations on non-audit services imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 - e®ectively
guarantees that the auditor complies with management's wishes.
It is altogether clear that in the current institutional setting, the anticipation of potential
gains from acquiescing in management's wishes more than o®sets the threat of legal liability
against auditors from shareholder class action suits. Furthermore, a large proportion of
shareholder recoveries in audit failure-related class action suits are paid out of corporations'
own resources. Ironically, such recoveries diminish the wealth of shareholders who purchased
the shares at prices potentially in°ated as a result of misrepresentations even further due to
deadweight losses arising from the cost of defending the suit. It is tempting to suggest that
an increase in the liability exposure of the auditors can deter malpractice but this falls short
on two grounds. First, it fails to address the misallocation of risk and resources. Imposing
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higher litigation penalties on the auditor ex post does not enhance the ability of society
to distinguish, ex ante, between ¯rms with intrinsically high returns and the Enrons and
Worldcoms of the world which have intrinsically low or negative returns but misrepresent
themselves as high-return ¯rms. Second, increasing exposure to liability and instituting high
legislated penalties may drive auditors out of the business of auditing altogether. Again, not
a welcome prospect.
To summarize, under the existing regime, penalties on the auditor are e®ectively reim-
bursed by the client and consequently have no incentive e®ect for the auditor. The auditor
is prepared to allow statements of low quality to be released to the market because the value
of the ongoing engagement outweigh the e®ects of liability. Even if penalties are increased,
they will typically be applied after the misallocation of capital takes place and draconian
penalties may kill o® the audit industry. Further, the costs of suing auditors is high, so only
the most egregious cases will ¯nd their way into a court of law. Low probability of detection
and punishment combined with high penalties distort incentives for providing high-quality
¯nancial statements. To the extent that information about ¯nancial statement quality does
not get impounded in prices, there is less of an incentive to improve this quality ex-ante.
In proposing Financial Statement Insurance, we argue that the imperfect alignment of
interests between managers and shareholders and the intractable con°ict of interest imposed
on auditors cannot be recti¯ed through legislation, regulation, enforcement, or litigation.
Instead, what is needed is an agency relationship between the auditor and an appropriate
principal, whose economic interests are solely aligned with the goal of promoting the quality
of the ¯nancial statement. In other words, there is the need to align the interest of share-
holders with the auditor's reward structure through an intermediary who does not bene¯t
from the price at which securities are traded.3 In the context of a free market mechanism,
3Such a realignment of interests would contribute to restoring the \complete ¯delity to the public's trust" that Chief Justice
Burger insisted on in a celebrated opinion: \By certifying the public reports that collectively depict a corporation's ¯nancial
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insurance carriers can serve the role of such an intermediary. The critical features of the
FSI scheme underlying this study are the following:(i)the e®ect of publicizing the premium
charged to di®erent ¯rms; and (ii)the shift of control over the auditor's compensation and,
hence, incentive structure from management to the insurer. We seek to formalize these two
features and to demonstrate that FSI, when linked with appropriate disclosure provisions,
leads ¯rms to improve the quality of their disclosures voluntarily.
In Section 2, we develop a formal model for analyzing the link between economic e±ciency
and the quality of the ¯nancial statement. We then examine the consequences of allowing
signaling through the insurance premium. In Section 4, we examine the consequences of
making the auditor an agent of the insurance-carrier rather than management under an
assumption that the auditor acts as an individual utility maximizer. Section 5 contains our
conclusions. .
2 Model
We develop a model in which ¯rms try to attract capital through their ¯nancial reports.
The basic framework is one in which a ¯rm's management invariably bene¯ts from obtaining
capital, but there is a social loss if low rate of return projects are funded. 4 We consider an
economy with N ¯rms, where each ¯rm has L possible rates of return r1 < r2 < : : : < rL. We
shall refer to a ¯rm with rate-of-return ri as being of type i. The rates of return for each ¯rm
f , denoted by rf , is drawn randomly by nature at the start of the period and is independent
of other ¯rms. In addition, we assume that there is a minimum threshold rate, r¤, such that
status, the independent auditor assumes a public responsibility transcending any employment relationship with the client. The
independent public accountant performing this special function owes ultimate allegiance to the corporation's creditors and
stockholders, as well as to the investing public. This \public watchdog" function demands that the accountant maintain total
independence from the client at all times and requires complete ¯delity to the public trust" [465 U.S. 805, 818].
4More generally, it is possible to consider a multi-period consumption-investment model where investing in some of the
projects reduces overall welfare calculated across several periods.
5
funding ¯rms with rates of return less than r¤ results in a social loss. r¤ represents the social
cost of capital and is assumed to be independent of ¯rm's rates of return. We assume that
r¤ > r1 so that funding projects randomly results in some expected social loss. In the ¯rst-
best scenario, in which each ¯rm's rate of return is perfectly inferred, only ¯rms with rates
of return higher than r¤ will obtain capital. In a second-best scenario, however, in which
investors do not know each ¯rm's type, investors decide whether to allocate capital to ¯rm f
based on its ¯nancial report, denoted by µf . Investors analyze the report, µf , and fund ¯rm
f if the implied rate-of-return, r^f , is greater than the threshold rate r
¤. The problem faced
by investors is that ¯rms have the ability to strategically bias ¯nancial reports and obtain
capital even when rf < r
¤.
The managers of a ¯rm typically bene¯t in both pecuniary and non-pecuniary ways from
capital in°ows; we represent the bene¯t of capital in°ows to management by a parameter B,
for bene¯ts. In other words, by ensuring a capital in°ow, the ¯rm's management generates
both a return rf , which is passed back to shareholders and a bene¯t B for themselves.
5 The
manager's goal in our model is to maximize potential bene¯ts to themselves by convincing
investors to provide capital.
The strategic tool for obtaining capital is an audited ¯nancial report that is issued to
investors. Although this report may not be directly falsi¯ed, it can be manipulated indirectly
through a reduction in the quality of the statements.6 At the start, the managers of ¯rm f
are assumed to obtain a private signal, !f , about their future rates of return. We denote by
5We use the term \capital in°ow" and henceforth also \funding" in a broad sense to include any purchases of the ¯rm's stock
by investors - whether in a public o®ering or in secondary trading. In the latter case, the purchase of stock exerts an upward
pressure on its price thereby decreasing the ¯rm's cost of capital. The ¯rm would be able to ¯nance investment projects that it
could not a®ord without the price increase (price in°ation in the case of misrepresentation). For example it can do so by selling
treasury stock at the higher price, obtaining debt ¯nancing at lower cost due to a lower debt-equity ratio, etc.; management,
as well, bene¯ts through the increased value of stock and options holdings.
6A typical example may be the choice of classifying a capital lease as an operating lease by using a higher than warranted
discount rate.
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the symbol P (ij!f ) the probability that the realized rate of return will be ri for a ¯rm, f
that receives a private signal, !f . Based on their private signal, the ¯rm's manager chooses
accounting policies that may increase or decrease their ¯nancial statement quality (FSQ)
denoted by the parameter x. After the ¯rms' rate of return is realized, the ¯nancial report
µf , is issued by ¯rm f to investors. The inferred rate of return contingent on the report
depends on the quality x.
In our formulation, the lower the quality of ¯nancial statements, the greater the proba-
bility that the ¯rm's rate of return is misinterpreted. To arrive at this feature, we introduce
two parameters that determine ¯nancial statement quality.
Assumption 1 (Determinants of FSQ)
FSQ is determined by two parameters, q 2 Q and e 2 E where Q and E denote closed
bounded cubes in <A and <B respectively. q is chosen by the ¯rm and e by the auditor. We
write X = Q£E and use the symbol X to denote the pair (q; e).
The next step is to link x (and thereby, q and e) with the probability distribution of how
¯rms are represented relative to their true type. Let P (jji;x) represent the probability that
a ¯rm f of type i receives a report µf = j (that is, a report implying a return of rj) under
FSQ x. We assume that all errors are one-sided; that is, a ¯rm f of type i only receives
reports µf = j ¸ i.7 The key step is to describe how P (jji;x) changes in quality x.
We begin by noting that our parameter set, X = Q £ E, representing quality, has a
natural component wise partial order; that is, for x;y 2 X, y ¹ x if and only if every
component of x is greater than the corresponding component of y. In terms of the probability
distribution P (jji;x), a reduction in quality ought to \increase" the level of overstatement.
The notion of \increase" in a probability distribution is captured by of ¯rst-degree stochastic
7Recall that at the time of the report, ¯rms know their true rate of return. The idea is that ¯rms will correct any downside
error by providing correct information about their type but will allow overstatements to proceed uncorrected.
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dominance(hereafter, FDSD). The next assumption links the natural partial order on our
quality parameter with the partial order of FDSD on distributions.
Assumption 2 (FSQ and First-Degree Stochastic Dominance)
The probability of overstatement increases in the sense of ¯rst-degree stochastic dominance
(hereafter, FDSD) as FSQ decreases. More formally, for a given type i
(1) P (jji;y) FDSD's P (jji;x) whenever y ¹ x.
In addition, we shall make the further structural assumption that higher signals are \good
news" :
(2) For a given quality x,
P (jji;x)
P (jjk;x) is increasing in j whenever i ¸ k,
and that lower quality makes it harder to separate ¯rms through their reports, that is,
(3) For any two types i; k with i > k and two FSQ levels y ¹ x, it is harder to sepa-
rate i and k through their reports at the lower FSQ y than at the higher FSQ x. In
distributional terms this is expressed as:
LX
j=l
fP (jji;x)¡ P (jjk;x)g ¸
LX
j=l
fP (jji;y)¡ P (jjk;y)g for every l ¸ k
Assumption (1) sums up the major formal content of the de¯nition, that is, lower FSQ
translates to increased misinterpretation in the sense of FDSD. Assumption 2 imposes an
intuitive restriction on the relationship between the true rate of return and the ¯nancial
reported value. The relationship asserts that higher signals are "good news" about types in
the sense of Milgrom [?]. (3) strengthens (1); indeed, when there are only two types and
i = 2; k = 1, (3) is reduced to the requirement that P (2j1;y) > P (2j1;x) which is exactly
the same as (1). With multiple types, more regularity in the way that the weights shift to
the upper tails is needed. (3) states that the relative weight in the upper tail converges for
all types as FSQ is reduced.
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Although Assumption 2 captures the reporting technology, investor inferences are a®ected
by an additional consideration. The central behavioral premise underlying our formulation
is that ¯rms can strategically use low-quality ¯nancial statements to mislead investors.8
Because ¯nancial statement quality is unobservable and may be strategically manipulated,
(Bayesian) rational investors will form conjectures regarding this quality. Upon observing a
¯nancial statement investors will assign some probability that the statements are, in fact,
misleading. This \scepticism" will be based on priors regarding FSQ. Denote these priors
by ~º = fº1; º2; : : : ; ºLg; investors believe that a ¯rm with private signal !l issues ¯nancial
statements of quality ºl.
9 The inferred distribution of types based on beliefs ~º and a report
µf = j is denoted by P (ijµf = j; ~º) or P (ijj; ~º) for simplicity. Consider this distribution for
a ¯rm that receives a private signal !l. Such a ¯rm will choose some (optimal) quality level
xk = x(!l). The ¯rm will then have a realized rate of return of ri with probability P (ij!l).
In turn, this rate of return will be overstated as µf = j ¸ i with probability P (jji;xf ).
Investors will try to reverse this process. Upon seeing a report µf = j, they will assign
some probability that the ¯rms private signal was !l. Then, using their beliefs regarding the
FSQ chosen by this type of ¯rm, ºl, they will form posterior probabilities, P (ijj; ~º), that the
rate of return would be ri. They will then calculate an expected rate of return, E[rjµf ; ~º]
for ¯rm f .
In order to perform this calculation, we ¯rst observe that the joint probability distribution
8Of course, the use of misleading ¯nancial statements opens the ¯rm to potential liability. Therefore, lower quality should
lead to a greater probability of overestimating the rate of return as well as higher liability. The bene¯ts of acquiring capital
through a misleading ¯nancial statement must be balanced against the legal exposure in determining the optimal FSQ level.
9Given our assumption that ¯rm types are drawn independently, all ¯rms with the same private signal !l face identical
decision problems regarding optimal implementation of quality. We simplify the belief structure by assuming that each ¯rm
with a given private signal !l has a single quality choice assigned to it. A more general formulation would set the perceived
quality ºl to be a measure on Q£E.
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of i; !l; j is as follows:
P (i; µf = j; !l;x) = P (jji;x)P (i; !l) = P (jji;x)P (ij!l)P (!l) (1)
Equation (1) states that once the type, i, is realized, the probability of report j, is determined
by the actual value of i and the FSQ x, and is independent of the earlier imperfect signal
!l. Built into this equation is the fact that the joint distribution of i and !l is una®ected
by the choice of x { that is, the ¯nancial reporting choice a®ects only the reported rate of
return and not the actual rate of return, ri. It follows that P (i; jj!l;x) = P (jji;x)P (ij!x)
and that:
P (ijµf = j; !l;x) = P (jji;x)P (ij!l)PL
i=1 P (jji;x)P (ij!l)
(2)
Using (2) and the (prespeci¯ed) beliefs ~º, the expected rate of return for a ¯rm that originally
received (an unknown) private signal !l and has reported µf = j is given by:
E[rjµf = j; !l; ~º] = E[rjµf = j; !l; ºl] =
PL
i=1 riP (jji; ºl)P (ij!l)PL
i=1 P (jji; ºl)P (ij!l)
(3)
Finally, the expected rate of return for an arbitrary ¯rm f reporting µf = j is the expectation
of (3) over the probability distribution
E[rjµf = j; ~º] =
LX
l=1
E[rjµf = j; !l; ~º]P (!l) =
LX
l=1
(PL
i=1 riP (jji; ºl)P (ij!l)PL
i=1 P (jji; ºl)P (ij!l)
)
P (!l) (4)
At this stage, we make the important qualitative observation that all ¯rms that issue a
particular report µf = j are assigned the same inferred expected rate of return. We contrast
this with the situation where in addition to a ¯nancial report, µf , ¯rms also report their
insurance premium, ¼f .
Denoting the inferred rate of return under beliefs ~º conditional on both report and pre-
mium by E[rjµf = j; ¼f ; ~º], we obtain:
E[rjµf = j; ~º; ¼f ] =
LX
l=1
LX
l=1
(PL
i=1 riP (jji; ºl)P (ij!l)PL
i=1 P (jji; ºl)P (ij!l)
)
P (!lj¼f ; ~º) (5)
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The key di®erence between (4) and (5) is that the premium reveals something about the
FSQ, and this in turn is re°ected in the inferred rate of return through a posterior probability
distribution about the private signal types that will end up with that premium. To illustrate
further, suppose that a ¯rm with the lowest private signal type !1 is assumed to choose a
low FSQ º1 with a resulting premium ¼1. Then, conditional on observing that ¯rm f has
been o®ered a low premium ¼f < ¼1, the probability weight P (!1j¼f ; ~º) = 0. In other words,
¯rms will be able to reveal their private signals through their reported premiums and thereby
a®ect the inferred report-contingent rate of return.
The inferred rate of return for ¯rm f depends on beliefs ~º and can di®er from the actual
distribution, P (ijj;xf ). However, we impose the condition that in-equilibrium, ºk = x(!k)
where x(!k) denotes the FSQ implemented by a ¯rm with private information !k. This
is an important point that needs to be emphasized. Firms have the ability to distort the
perceived level of FSQ but this is not a stable \equilibrium" situation. For an equilibrium to
be sustainable, it must be optimal for ¯rms and auditors to set FSQ levels that are consistent
with investor beliefs.
2.1 Liability Structure
Both ¯rms and auditors face penalties under provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Securities
Acts and other statutory and case law when they issue inaccurate ¯nancial reports. Such
penalties act both to increase the quality of ¯nancial statements and to provide some level
of compensation to investors. For the purposes of analysis, we assume that the coverage
under the proposed FSI scheme is the same as the expected recovery under the current
institutional arrangements. In general, FSI permits more direct and less restrictive coverage
than the penalties imposed by the Securities Acts. That is, FSI directly insures investors
against misrepresentations in the ¯nancial statements; under the present regime, on the other
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hand, insurance is \indirect" as it covers the liability of directors and auditors. Aspects of
the FSI scheme outlined in Ronen (2002) that are not addressed in our formal analysis are
discussed in Section 4.
Recall that the lower the FSQ, the greater the probability that the ¯nancial report will
imply too high a rate of return. Because a ¯rm is liable for penalties whenever its ¯nancial
statements are deemed to be misleading, we model liability simply as a function of the FSQ
choices. The ¯rm's expected liability is denoted by Lf(q) and the auditor's expected liability
by La(q; e). Implicit in this notation is the legal structure, because the ¯rm is liable only
for its quality choice but auditors are liable for both poor quality statements issued by the
¯rm and their own level of quality improvement (represented by the choice of e). The only
structure we impose is the following:
(1) Lf(q) decreases in q (under the usual partial order on q) and La(q; e) decreases in both
q and e.10
(2) The cross-partial
@2
@ei@qj
(La(q; e)) < 0 for every i; j, that is, the marginal e®ect of an
increase in audit quality on liability is less if the ¯rm has already implemented a higher
quality (and the auditor faces lower liability).
This second assumption is needed to set up a monotone relationship between the ¯rm's
choice of quality and the overall FSQ obtained as a combination of both q and e choices (see
Lemma 3).
3 Results
The main focus of our formal analysis is to establish two results:
10We are realistically mindful of the fact that liability for erroneous disclosures exists even when the ¯rm does not attract
additional capital. Indeed, as long as the ¯rm's securities are publicly traded, it faces potential liability under the 1934 Securities
Act.
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(1) To show that a public disclosure of the insurance premium charged on the ¯nancial
statement increases the e±ciency of capital allocation; and
(2) To show that switching the audit employment contract to the insurer in addition to dis-
closing the premium increases both the quality of ¯nancial reporting and the e±ciency
of capital allocation.
We begin by motivating the ¯rst result through an example. In order to make the example
as simple as possible, we suppress the role of the auditor and assume that the insurer can
observe the quality of the ¯nancial statement costlessly.
An Example
First, we assume that there are N ¯rms each of which can have two possible rates of return,
i.e., that there are two types (L=2). In addition, we assume that the quality variable, q, is
one-dimensional and lies in [0; q], where q < 1. Next, we assume that the private information
is perfect. !l = 1; 2 reveals the expected rate of return as ri and eliminate the role of the
auditor by setting P (iji; q; e) = q for i = 1; 2. That is, with FSQ q, the probability that the
¯rm's type is reported correctly is q, and, as there are only two types, the probability of the
¯rm being misclassi¯ed is 1 ¡ q. Let the beliefs of investors be represented by ºi; the ¯rm
that receives a private signal that it's rate of return is ri is expected to set its FSQ at ºi.
Assuming that each ¯rm-type is equally probable, the inferred rates-of return are as follows:
r^2 = E[rjµf = 2] = r1(1¡ º1) + r2
(1¡ º1) + 1 =
1¡ º1
2¡ º1 r1 +
1
2¡ º1 r2 (6)
r^1 = E[rjµf = 1] = r1 (7)
It follows that the funding probability from picking FSQ level q for a ¯rm that receives
private signal !f = 1 is given by:
FP (q; 1) = qF (r^1) + (1¡ q)F (r^2; ) (8)
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where F denotes the distribution function of r¤. Because r^2 > r^1, it follows that the funding
probability is strictly decreasing in q for every type 1 ¯rm. In contrast, a ¯rm with private
signal !f = 2 has a realized rate of return 2 and its funding probability is una®ected by the
choice of q (because it's type cannot be overstated).
If the bene¯ts of funding are su±ciently high, the ¯rm with a low private signal will set
q¤1 = 0. It therefore is always reported as µ = 2, and it follows from Equation 6 that, in
equilibrium, where º1 = q
¤
1 = 0, r^2 = (r1+r2)=2. In this setting, the social loss arises because
¯rms with low rates of return are funded even though they lie below the opportunity cost r¤
and high rates of return ¯rms are funded too infrequently. The two components of the loss
(per unit of capital) are given as follows:
(1)
R (r1+r2)=2
r1
(r¤ ¡ r1)f(r¤)dr¤ because low-type ¯rms are funded and
(2)
R r2
(r1+r2)=2
(r2 ¡ r¤)f(r¤)dr¤ because high-type ¯rms are not funded.
The total social loss may then be written as:
Z r2
r1
minfr¤ ¡ r1; r2 ¡ r¤gf(r¤)dr¤ (9)
In contrast, consider the case where the ¯rm's choice of FSQ is known to the insurer who
then sets a premium based on the level of coverage. We shall assume that the cost of coverage
is strictly decreasing in quality, that is, ¼(q) is decreasing in q. In this example, the following
is seen to be an equilibrium:
² Both Firm types choose FSQ q = q, i.e., the highest quality ¯nancial statement, and
pay the associated (low) insurance premium ¼(q).
² Any ¯rm that is observed to have a premium ¼ > ¼(q) is classi¯ed as a type-1 ¯rm.
To see that this represents an equilibrium, let q¤1 represent the equilibrium FSQ choice of
Firm f that has received private signal !1; either q
¤
1 < q or q1 = q. If, q
¤
1 < q, the premium
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rate for ¯rm f , ¼(q¤1) > ¼(q); and its inferred rate of return is r1 irrespective of the report.
Therefore, it's probability of funding is F (r1). If however, Firm f mimics the high private-
signal ¯rm and sets q¤1 = q, the inferred rates of return are given by
r2 = E[rjµf = 2] = r1(1¡ q) + r2
(1¡ q) + 1 =
"
1¡ q
2¡ q
#
r1 +
"
1
2¡ q
#
r2
r1 = E[rjµf = 1] = r1
and the probability of funding increases by (1¡ q)[F (r2)¡ F (r1)] (i.e., by the higher prob-
ability of funding when the ¯rm is reported as \type-2."). Note that the social loss now
becomes::
(1) (1¡ q)
Z r2
r1
(r¤ ¡ r1)f(r¤)dr¤ because low-type ¯rms are funded and
(2)
Z r2
r2
(r2 ¡ r¤)f(r¤)dr¤ because high-type ¯rms are not funded.
with attendant social loss:
Z r2
r1
minf(1¡ q)(r¤ ¡ r1); r2 ¡ r¤gf(r¤)dr¤ (10)
Any r¤ · r2 can be written as a convex combination ¸r1+(1¡¸)r2 with ¸ ¸ (1¡q)=(2¡q);
it follows that for r¤ · r2,
(1¡ q)(r¤ ¡ r1) = (1¡ q)(1¡ ¸)(r2 ¡ r1) · (1¡ q)
Ã
1¡ 1¡ q
2¡ q
!
(r2 ¡ r1) = 1¡ q
2¡ q (r2 ¡ r1)
· minfr¤ ¡ r1; r2 ¡ r¤g (11)
A comparison of (9) and (10) shows that the social loss is reduced through the provision of
FSI.
Notice in this example that if a ¯rm with private signal !f = 1 sets q1 < q, then the best
response for the ¯rm with the high private signal is to set q2 = q { this separating policy
leads to funding with probability F (r2) at a minimum insurance cost. if, however, the ¯rm
with the high private signal sets q2 = q, the best strategy for a ¯rm with low private signal
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is to "mimic" and set q1 = q. Mimicry increases the funding probability (and leads to the
equilibrium described above). In contrast, when the type-1 ¯rm sets q1 = q and the type-2
¯rm sets q2 < q the situation is untenable in equilibrium because by increasing q slightly,
the type-2 ¯rm reduces insurance costs but still separates itself from the type-1 ¯rm. Thus,
q1 = q, q2 < q should never be an equilibrium. Hence, the only plausible equilibrium is for
both ¯rms to set qi = q. We shall return to this point formally in Proposition 4.
This example does not incorporate a role for the auditor, but a little re°ection shows that
the core intuition survives in a more complex setting where reports are in°uenced by an
auditor acting under moral hazard. In particular, if the income of the auditor is determined
by the insurer, su±cient incentives may be provided to elicit truthful revelation regarding
the FSQ. Once FSQ is known (perhaps imperfectly) to the insurer, premium levels reveal
this information to investors. In particular, when ¯rms defect from the anticipated level of
FSQ, that is, if a ¯rm has been charged a premium ¼f higher than anticipated, investors
¯nd out about this before trading. We are then essentially back in the situation discussed
in the example.
The example has the characteristics of a signaling model where ¯rms are separated out
through the level of the insurance premium. Yet, there is an important di®erence. In a
standard signaling model, the di®erential costs of signals across types arise from an exogenous
factor related to type. In contrast, in the setting of the example, the cost of signals di®ers
across types because of an endogenous factor { the reaction of providers of capital. For this
reason, the initial beliefs of investors play a signi¯cant role in the analysis.
Let fº1; º2g = ~º represent the beliefs of investors. In this example, the expected return
on the high report, µ = 2, is some weighted average of r2 and r1 with the weights depending
on ~º; in addition, because Firm 2 always issues report µ = 2, the weight on r2 is strictly
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positive. In contrast, the report µ = 1 necessarily implies that the rate of return is r1. Thus,
rational investors would fund the report µ = 2 with a greater probability than the report
µ = 1. Our ¯rst objective is to establish an analogous result in full generality; that is, we
show that the probability of funding increases in the report (Lemma 1), and consequently
that it decreases in FSQ (Proposition 1).
3.1 Funding Probability
In this section we develop the notation and structure related to the probability that a given
¯rm will obtain funding under FSQ choices q; e. The ¯rst result that we establish con¯rms
the plausibility of our information structure. Speci¯cally, we show that higher rates of return
are associated with better reports and with higher private signals.
Lemma 1 (Better reports imply higher expected returns)
For any beliefs ºf regarding the FSQ of a ¯rm, a higher reported rate of return implies a
(strictly) greater inferred rate of return.
Proof:
Suppose that k > i. We have to show that a ¯rm s with report µs = k has a higher inferred
rate of return than another, t, with report µt = i.
From :
Es[rjµs = k; ~º] =
LX
l=1
(Pk
j=1 rjP (kjj; ºl)p(jj!l)Pk
j=1 P (kjj; ºl)p(jj!l)
)
p(!l)
Et[rjµt = i; ~º] =
LX
l=1
(Pi
j=1 rjP (ijj; ºl)p(jj!l)Pi
j=1 P (ijj; ºl)p(jj!l)
)
p(!l) (12)
De¯ne for 1 · j · i¡ 1:
»jl =
P (kjj; ºl)P (jj!l)Pk
t=1 P (kjt; ºl)P (tj!l)
; Ãjl =
P (ijj; ºl)P (jj!l)Pi
t=1 P (ijt; ºl)P (tj!l)
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De¯ne for j = i:
»il =
Pk
t=i P (kjt; ºl)P (tj!l)Pk
t=1 P (kjt; ºl)P (tj!l)
; Ãil =
P (iji; ºl)P (ij!l)Pi
t=1 P (ijt; ºl)P (tj!l)
Note that by de¯nition,
Pi
j=1 »jl =
Pi
j=1 Ãjl = 1, that is, »jl and Ãjl are probability distri-
butions. Now let wj =
»jl
Ãjl
. By Assumption 2 part (1), wj is a strictly increasing function of
j for j · i. Consequently,
Es[rjµs = k; ~º] =
LX
l=1
(Pk
j=1 rjP (kjj; ºl)P (jj!l)Pk
j=1 P (kjj; ºl)P (jj!l)
)
p(!l)
=
LX
l=1
8<:
iX
j=1
rj»jl
9=; p(!l) =
LX
l=1
8<:
iX
j=1
rjwjÃjl
9=; p(!l)
>
LX
l=1
8<:
24 iX
j=1
wjÃjl
35£
24 iX
j=1
rjÃjl
359=; p(!l) =
LX
l=1
8<:[1]£
jX
i=1
rjÃjl
9=; p(!l)
= Et[rjµt = i; ~º] (13)
For any given ¯rm f , the funding probability, FPf , depends both on its own report and the
realized level of the threshold, r¤. Firm f will be funded provided that E[rjµf ; ~º] (or, anal-
ogously, E[rjµf = j; ¼f ; ~º]) is greater than or equal to the cuto® value, r¤. This probability
is, by de¯nition, the value of the cumulative distribution of r¤ evaluated at E[rjµf ; ~º]. To
simplify the notation, we set r^jf = Ef [rjµf = j; ~º] and write F (r¤) for the distribution of r¤.
The funding probability for a ¯rm with private signal !k that chooses FSQ x may then be
summarized as in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 (Funding probabilities)
Denote the probability that a ¯rm f with report µf = j will be funded (under beliefs ~º) by
FPf (jj~º) and the total probability across (all reports) under FSQ choice x by FPf (xj!l; ~º).
Then:
(1) FPf (jj~º) = F (r^jf ) (recall that F is the distribution function of r¤ and F (r^jf ) is the
probability that r¤ · r^jf .)
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(2) FPf (xj!l; ~º) =
LX
i=1
8<:
LX
j=i
F (r^jf )P (jji;x)
9=;P (ij!l)
Proof:
Follows directly from the de¯nitions of FPf and r^jf and the fact that funding is provided
whenever r^jf ¸ r¤.
The funding probability for any ¯rm f has the following properties:
(1) The component FPf (jj~º) is dependent on the observed report and beliefs regarding
FSQ choices of ¯rms represented by ~º.
(2) If the ¯rm f realizes rate of return i, its report distribution, P (µf = jji;x) is determined
by the choice of x.
(3) Based on it's private information !l, beliefs about other ¯rm's reporting choices º¡f ,
and litigation cost Lf(x), ¯rm f chooses its level of quality x
The next proposition shows how the probability of funding for ¯rm f changes in the FSQ
choices.
Proposition 1 (Funding probability and FSQ choice)
For any ¯rm f and any beliefs ~º, FPf (xj!l; ~º) is a strictly decreasing function of x.
Proof:
Fix any beliefs ~º. From Lemma 1 and Lemma (2; (1)), FPf (jj~º) is always strictly increasing
in reported type µf = j. It follows from Lemma (2; (2)) and Assumption (2; (1)) that the
total funding probability, FPf (xj~º; !l), is strictly decreasing in x.
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We now state the formal program for the strategic choice of ¯nancial statement quality for
a ¯rm f receiving a private signal !k (with a non-strategic auditor).
Program I'
maxq;e;F FPf(q; ej!k; ~º¡f )B ¡Lf(q)¡ F
subject to
U(F ¡ La(q; e))¡ C(e) ¸ U (IR)
ºi = (q
¤; e¤) (RE)
The last equation imposes the requirement that the beliefs about quality agree with the
actual optimal choice implemented by the ¯rm of type i in equilibrium. De¯ning
F (e;q) = U¡1
³
U + C(e)
´
+ La(q; e) (14)
the maximization program may be rewritten as:
Program I
maxq;e FPf(q; ej!k; ~º¡f )B ¡Lf (q)¡ F (q; e)
subject to
ºi = (q
¤; e¤) (RE)
We now turn to the analysis of the situation in which the auditor works for the insurer.
In this second setting, the ¯rm again sets the FSQ, q but the auditor reports q back to
the insurance company. For simplicity, assume that the auditor reports the true value q.
Based on this report, the insurance company o®ers a premium ¼f . The insurance premium
is revealed to the market along with the ¯nancial report. In addition, the insurer implements
a level of audit quality e through a suitable incentive scheme. The higher the audit quality
implemented, the lower the probability of error.
Denote the observed pro¯le of insurance premiums by ~¼, where ¼f is the premium charged
to ¯rm f . Let E[rf jµf ; ¼f ] represent the inferred return expected by investors from ¯rm f
after observing the report µf and an insurance premium ¼f . Let FPf (q; ej!k; ~¼) denote the
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funding probability expected by a ¯rm f that receives a private signal !k and implements
FSQ fq; eg. The maximization program for ¯rm f is then given by:
Program II
maxq;e;F FPf (q; ej!k; ~¼)B ¡ ¼f
subject to
¼f = mine Lf(q) + F (q; e) (BE)
ºi = (q
¤; e¤) (RE)
The two main di®erences between the programs are (i) that the premiums o®ered to each
¯rm, ~¼ = f¼1; : : : ; ¼Lg are observable; and (ii) the level of audit quality, e, is chosen to
minimize the total cost to the insurer which consists of the expected claim cost Lf and
the audit fee. To maintain notational comparability with Program I, we add the expected
litigation cost borne by the auditor to the audit fee. That is, the symbol F denotes the "total
audit cost" of service plus the expected litigation cost; in both cases the auditor actually
retains the amount F less the expected litigation cost. The premium itself is assumed to
be the break- even value for the insurer (constraint (BE)){ a common assumption in the
insurance literature.
Because ¯rms and investors are assumed to be risk-neutral, there are no risk-sharing
considerations, and insurance does not directly enhance economic e±ciency. Rather, the
premium functions purely as a signaling device. An important consequence of introducing
¯nancial statement insurance relates to the public disclosure of the premium. Such disclo-
sures reveal the quality of the ¯nancial statements to investors and make it possible for ¯rms
to capture the bene¯ts of implementing high-quality ¯nancial systems. In particular, when
¯nancial statement insurance premiums are publicly reported, investors can infer which ¯-
nancial statements are truly of high-quality and channel their investments in a more e±cient
fashion.
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3.2 Optimal FSQ Choices
To explain the potential bene¯ts from introducing FSI, we analyze two separate situations:
(i) q; e are directly observable by the insurer, and the premium is based on these observed
values; and
(ii) q; e are unobservable by the insurer and the auditor has to be incentivized to report
these values truthfully to the insurer.
In each setting, we analyze the consequences of (i) making insurance premiums observable
and (ii) switching the auditor from being an agent of the ¯rm to becoming an agent of the
insurance company. We analyze two di®erent situations with regard to the auditor's e®ort
because this choice a®ects the probability of overstatement. Arguably, the ¯rm is privy
to whether overstatements take place, and aware of the auditor's correction strategy. In
the next section, we drop this assumption and analyze the situation where the auditor's
corrective actions are assumed to be unobservable and the auditor is an agent functioning
under moral hazard in the classical sense.
Proposition 2 (Equilibrium with uncertainty regarding quality)
Suppose that the bene¯ts from funding,B, are very large relative to the penalties for over-
statement { speci¯cally, that the partial derivatives of the liability function in q and e satisfy:
(1) B >
(
@
@q
³
F (q; e) + Lf (q)
´)( @
@q
³
FPf (q; ej!l; ~º)
´)¡1
(2) B >
(
@
@e
³
F (q; e)
´)( @
@e
³
FPf (q; ej!l; ~º)
´)¡1
.
Then the equilibrium quality levels are for every ¯rm to set qf = q where q is the minimum
permissible level and implement e = 0. Consequently, capital is allocated to low rate of return
¯rms with relatively high probability.
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Proof:
From Proposition 1, the condition in the hypothesis of this proposition ensures that the
maximand in Program 1 increases from reducing FSQ choices q; e. It follows that every ¯rm
will set the lowest level of FSQ in equilibrium.and induce the lowest possible e®ort level from
the auditor.
Proposition 2 shows that if the bene¯ts to funding are large enough, it sets o® a \race to the
bottom"in terms of FSQ. We now proceed to analyze the e®ects of introducing FSI. Assume
that each ¯rm purchases insurance and that the premiums charged to ¯rms are observable.
Suppose now that in equilibrium some ¯rm f sets qf < qL, where L is the highest type ¯rm.
Then, the premium charged to ¯rm f , ¼f is strictly larger than ¼L and investors will infer
that ¯rm f is of some type other than L. Thus, the inferred rate of return conditioned on
observing ¼f will be di®erent from that based on the prior beliefs, ~º. We will show that the
disclosure of ¼f and attendant changes in the inferred rate of return lead to an equilibrium
where all ¯rms pool at the highest level of quality, q.
Two details concerning the relationship between the observed premium, ¼f , and the in-
ferred FSQ (and type) of ¯rm f must be cleared up before we can present the equilibrium
with FSI. First, based on ¼f , investors form posterior beliefs about the ¯rm's FSQ. However,
FSQ depends on the choice of both q and e. We show in our next lemma that a unique level
of e is associated with each level of q. Thus, each probability distribution over q for ¯rm
f (formed after observing ¼f ) corresponds to a unique probability distribution over x; we
therefore can describe investor behavior as forming conjectures regarding x after observing
¼f .
Lemma 3 (Investor beliefs regarding FSQ after observing the premium)
For each level of q, there is a unique optimal level of e, and hence, a unique associated FSQ
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x. Each posterior distribution over the ¯rm's choice of q after observing ¼f therefore is
associated with a unique posterior distribution over FSQ x.
Proof:
Since La(q; e) is decreasing and convex in e, for each value of q there is a unique value of
e, denoted by e¤(q) that minimizes C(e) + La(q; e). In every program, it can be shown
that the level of e implemented in equilibrium is e¤(q). Further, by our assumption that the
marginal reduction in litigation cost decreases in FSQ, that is, the cross-partial of La(q; e)
in each q; e is negative (see Section 2.1 (2)), the convexity of C(e) implies that e¤(q) is
increasing in q. Each level of q therefore corresponds to the FSQ x(q) = fq; e¤(q)g where
x(q) is increasing in q.
Second, because FSQ is multidimensional but the premium is one-dimensional, we will as-
sume that increasing one dimension of FSQ while holding others constant results in a reduc-
tion of the associated premiums. In other words, we assume that if y ¹ x then the premium
associated with y is equal to or greater than that associated with x (with equality only if
y = x). This is consistent with Assumption 2 where the probability of overstatement, and
hence the associated liability, decreases as FSQ increases.
We now show formally that the equilibrium in which every ¯rm picks q exists under FSI.
Proposition 3 (Equilibrium with Financial Statement Quality Insurance)
When FSI is made available and premiums are disclosed, the equilibrium in which all ¯rms
set qf = q and the associated e is a rational expectations equilibrium. The expected rate of
return on the capital invested by society is increased through the provision of FSI.
Proof:
Let q denote the highest quality choice, e the associated optimal audit intensity and ¼ the
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resulting break-even premium (see Program II). A rational expectations equilibrium is given
by:
(1) Whenever ¼f = ¼, then p(!lj¼f) = 1=L for every l (in-equilibrium beliefs);
(2) Whenever ¼f < ¼, then p(!lj¼f) =
8><>>:
1 if l = 1
0 if l > 1
(o®-equilibrium beliefs);
Under the belief system above, any type paying premium ¼f > ¼ is perceived as type 1,
and the expected return E[rf jµf = j; ¼f ] = E[rf jµf = j; !1] is less than E[rf jµf = j; ¼].
Therefore, the funding probability declines for every report j whenever qf ¹ q is selected
(resulting in a premium ¼f > ¼).
Hence, FPf (q; ej¼f) < FPf (q; ej¼); in addition, ¼f > ¼. Deviating to q < q makes every
¯rm-type worse o® so the equilibrium is for all ¯rms to set q.
The fact that defections from high quality are detected and immediately penalized results
in the \°ight to quality" documented in Proposition 3. Speci¯cally, high-type ¯rms gain
from setting high FSQ. If low-type ¯rms can muddy investor perceptions through low FSQ,
high-type ¯rms are also driven to exaggerate their own outcomes, leading to the result in
Proposition 2. In contrast, in Proposition 3, by staying with high FSQ, good ¯rms force
others to follow suit or be identi¯ed as low types. Thus, low-type ¯rms either abandon their
quest for capital or accept a much lower probability of being able to mislead investors in
equilibrium.
Although Proposition 3 demonstrates that with FSI, the best possible quality imple-
mentation is an equilibrium, we cannot formally rule out all other equilibria. In general,
one can obtain economically unintuitive sequential equilibria by specifying implausible o®-
equilibrium beliefs. The standard device to rule out \bad equilibria" is to impose restrictions
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on such o®-equilibrium beliefs. In the simple case of two rates of return discussed in the
example, a direct proof can be given that \pooling-at-the-top" is the only equilibrium that
meets the divinity test.
Proposition 4 (Re¯nement Test)
Suppose L = 2 (as in our example). Then, the equilibrium where all ¯rms pool at the highest
level of quality q is the only one that meets the divinity re¯nement criterion.
Proof:
See Appendix 1.
The analysis in this section assumes that the insurance premium is based on the actual
level of FSQ chosen by ¯rms. More generally, the insurer relies on the auditor's assessment
of FSQ to set the premium. In the next two results, we show that if the auditor reports
FSQ strategically in order to maximize his own payo®s, the revelation of the premium to
investors does not break the "race to the bottom" with regard to audit quality so long as
the auditor functions as an agent of management. That is, ¯rms would prefer to get the
auditor to report a higher level of FSQ to the insurance company and thereby to investors
than the one that has been chosen. As rational insurers and investors will anticipate this
"bias", the equilibrium unravels to the lowest choice of FSQ. In contrast, when the auditor
functions as an agent of the insurer, the pooling at the highest quality again becomes the
rational equilibrium. We demonstrate this through the next two propositions.
3.3 Auditing with Moral Hazard
In this section, we introduce an auditor who has private information about the quality of the
reporting system and functions under moral hazard. We emphasize that the moral hazard
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is with regard to reporting the quality of the ¯nancial system and not with regard to audit
quality, that is, e is contractible, but the quality of the reporting system is not. From the
insurer's perspective, the number of hours the auditor actually worked or the rigor of the
tests applied to the ¯nancial statement are observable and contractible. However, the insurer
must rely on the auditor's report regarding the quality of the ¯nancial systems implemented
by the ¯rm. Under these circumstances, we have to modify Equation (14)as follows. Let q^
indicate the auditor's report regarding the ¯rm's ¯nancial statement quality. We assume that
a contractual transfer ¿(q^;q) from the auditor to the insurer can be prespeci¯ed whenever
there is litigation and the true quality q is revealed. Such a transfer allows the revelation
principle to be invoked, and we can de¯ne an amount F^ (q; e):
De¯nition 1 (Auditor Compensation)
F^ (q; e) is the minimum payment that must be made to induce the auditor to report the true
quality as q^ = q, to supply e®ort e, and to face the litigation cost La(q; e).
With this de¯nition, the formal program with the auditor as an agent of the insurance
company under moral hazard can be stated:
Program III
maxq FPf (q; ej~º¡f~¼)B ¡ ¼f
subject to
¼f = minF;e Lf (q) + F^ (q; e) (BE)
ºi = fqi; eig (RE)
The analog of Proposition 3 is straightforward. The proof goes through essentially unchanged
implying the following result.
Proposition 5 (Equilibrium with FSI and the Auditor as the Insurer's Agent)
When FSI is made available and premiums are disclosed, there is an equilibrium where all
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¯rms set qi = q. In addition, if L = 2, this is the only equilibrium meeting the divinity
criterion.
Proof:
Program III is virtually identical to Program II { the only di®erence is the fact that F^ (q; e)
replaces F (q; e).
To conclude our analysis, we discuss the (hypothetical) situation where the ¯rm purchases
¯nancial statement insurance but continues to pay the auditor. Under these circumstance,
it is reasonable to ask whether the publicizing the premium will have any bene¯cial con-
sequences. In other words, what are the consequences if insurance premiums are publicly
reported, but the auditor continues as an agent of the ¯rm? If the auditor continues as an
agent of the ¯rm, the ¯rm can write forcing contracts. Let F^ (q^;q; e) denote the cost to the
¯rm of getting the auditor to exert e®ort e and report the quality as q^ when the true quality
is q. Note that the auditor can be incentivized to reveal the true FSQ but the revelation
principle does not apply. The auditor is an agent of the ¯rm and the ¯rm already knows the
true FSQ. The real issue is whether the ¯rm can be incentivized to allow the true FSQ to be
revealed. This is where the revelation principle breaks down because the market's funding
strategies have to be ex-post rational and any form of precommitment is precluded.11In the
absence of precommitment to funding schemes, the revelation principle cannot be invoked.
When the auditor continues as an agent of the ¯rm truthful revelation of FSQ may
be impossible ex-ante. However, as discussed earlier, litigation will typically reveal the true
FSQ. Under these circumstances, the insurer will ¯nd it possible to specify a transfer, ¾(q^;q)
with the ¯rm (because the insurer has a contractual relationship only with the ¯rm). The
key point is that this transfer is made ex-post and will not be known at the time of trading.
11(See Wilson [3]) for a discussion of the incapacity of markets to precommit to pricing schemes.
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Hence the ¯rm does not internalize the cost of the low quality ex-ante.
The associated program will be the following:
Program IV
maxq^;q;e FPf (q; ej~º¡f~¼)B ¡ F^ (q^;q; e)¡ ¼f ¡ ¾(q^;q)
subject to
¼f = Lf(q^) + La(q^; e) (IP)
¾(q^;q) = [Lf (q)¡Lf (q^)] + [La(q^; e)¡La(q^; e)] (BE)
ºi = fqi; eig (RE)
The initial premium observed by the market (Constraint (IP)) re°ects the FSQ reported by
the auditor to the insurance company rather than the true FSQ. Under these circumstances,
the ¯rm will always have incentives to set low FSQ to increase the probability of funding
while incentivizing the auditor to over report the FSQ. Market participants will anticipate
this and set funding strategies based on low FSQ precipitating a \race to the bottom," as
summarized in our ¯nal result.
Proposition 6 (Equilibrium with insurance and with the Auditor as the Firm's Agent)
Suppose that the bene¯ts to funding,B, are very large relative to the penalties for overstate-
ment, L. In addition, suppose that the ¯nancial statement quality is unobservable and that
the auditor is an agent of the ¯rm. Then the equilibrium quality levels are for every ¯rm to
set qf = q where q is the minimum permissible level and implement e = 0. Consequently,
capital is allocated to ¯rms with low rate of return with relatively high probability.
Proof:
As F^ (q^;q; e) = F (q; e) (because the ¯rm will pay the auditor only if q^ is reported), Program
IV is essentially equivalent to Program I. The only minor di®erence is that beliefs may
be a®ected by observing the premium. However, ¯rms can costlessly change their initial
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premium by getting the auditor to report the suitable q^. For this reason, the premium
ceases to provide any information and Programs IV and I are essentially equivalent.
4 Discussion of Results and Implications
The formal analysis is focused on two salient features of the FSI scheme: disclosure of
premiums and changes in the agency relationship with the auditor. In this section, we discuss
the implications of the results and the economic features and institutional arrangements
that will have to be put in place to facilitate practical implementation. We discuss the
implications of the size of insurance coverage, auditor conservatism, and the likelihood of
collusion between the audit ¯rm and the insurance carrier.
4.1 Size of Coverage
The magnitude of potential liability arising from ¯nancial statement misrepresentations is
one of the key considerations in the FSI scheme. Are losses stemming from misrepresentations
likely to be too large to be covered by insurance companies? We do not think so. Financial
statement misrepresentation losses exist in the current regime and are borne in one way
or another by several players, including investors, companies (in the form of class action
litigation settlements), insurance companies (through D&O and malpractice underwriting
settlements), and the audit ¯rms and the ¯rms themselves through premiums paid on D&O
insurance. The e®ective "premium" companies and auditors now pay is considerably larger
that the nominal premium paid for D&O or malpractice insurance. In other words, if losses
result from accounting irregularities, someone must be bearing them. Hence, all things
considered, the cost of recoveries through a combination of D&O insurance and settlements
currently borne by investors in audit failure cases would necessarily be lower when the
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auditor's incentives are aligned with those of investors. Thus, the total premiums needed
to accord investors the same level of recovery cannot be greater than they are under the
current system. On the contrary, total losses under FSI are likely to be less because of
the incentives for companies to minimize their cost of capital, which will induce them to
minimize premiums by improving the quality of their ¯nancial statements and minimize the
loss-causing irregularities. This would be reinforced by the better quality audits. In other
words, even keeping the coverage and the extent to which investors' losses are recouped at
no more than it is today we would have improved audit quality, mitigated con°ict of interest,
and more e±cient resource allocation.
If companies demand large coverage, our FSI model can be adapted easily to handle this
situation. Unlike insuring against non-tradable assets such as personal accidents, building
¯res and the like, insurers can hedge their exposure in underwriting coverage for securitized
assets (equities) by devising suitable straddle strategies to "reinsure" their exposure in capital
markets. Under the proposed FSI mechanism, the insurers, who strictly speaking need not in
fact be insurance companies, can purchase options to hedge the risks, or better yet, purchase
specialized conditional puts, the exercise of which would be triggered by the occurrence of
the insured event: misrepresentation or omission. Note, too, that not all companies (and
hence securities) carry the same ¯nancial statement risk: some are better than others. Hence,
there is a possibility of constructing portfolios that are diversi¯ed on this dimension of risk:
the contribution of one security to the aggregate ¯nancial statement risk of the portfolio is
less then its own ¯nancial statement risk.
4.2 Auditor Conservatism
It is tempting to suggest that the FSI scheme might induce an excessive, and harmful, degree
of auditor conservatism. This need not be the case. We should point out that class action
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securities litigation can involve sellers who su®er losses resulting from overly conservative
statements as well as the typical purchasers' class. The fact that these were fewer in the past
merely re°ects the fact that companies' incentives are skewed in the direction of in°ating,
rather than de°ating, earnings. The FSI scheme would tend to balance the incentives and
induce less bias and greater accuracy in ¯nancial statements. If, for example, FSI induces
ultra-conservatism, the incidence of sellers' losses will be expected to increase, prompting a
higher insurers' expectation of sellers' claims, in turn inducing them to guide the auditors
they hire toward emphasis on greater accuracy. Removing the con°ict of interest through
the FSI scheme will minimize the potentially adverse e®ects in°icted by the subjectivity
that inheres in accounting decisions. As we discuss below, however, a GAAP reform could
reinforce the salutary e®ects of FSI.
4.3 Collusion between Firm and Insurance Carrier
Collusion between the company being audited and the insurance company is not plausible
under the FSI regime. It may be argued that because the audited ¯rm chooses the FSI
carrier out of a list of possible companies, it will be in the interest of the insurance company
to o®er a premium lower than the competitive rate in order to be selected. The insurance
carrier will have to be compensated for the loss by charging an unjusti¯ably high premium
on other policies supplied to the audited company.
Such a carrier faces various adverse consequences. First, the carrier would have to pub-
licize the lower premium as a requirement of the FSI scheme. This would result in a higher
price for the stock and higher capitalization, which in turn would increase the losses to share-
holders upon an event of omission or misrepresentation. Since the losses are an increasing
function of the ¯rm's market capitalization, the more in°ated the price, the larger the po-
tential price drop. The expected coverage cost incurred by the insurance carrier within the
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limit of the policy would increase, o®setting any gains from over charging on other services.
Second, since the audit report is publicly observed, the audit ¯rm will have to acquiesce
in the collusion between the carrier and company being audited for this to work. Third,
insurance carriers are subject to a very strict audit by the various regulatory insurance bod-
ies. Too low a premium would invite regulatory scrutiny and the possible establishment of
higher reserves, which would impose additional costs on the carrier. Finally, requiring public
disclosure of all premiums (on all insurance lines) paid by the FSI-insured would su±ce to
deter a conspiracy.
5 Conclusion
Several causes have been advanced in the media for the recent "accounting" meltdown: irra-
tional exuberance, infectious greed, the stock market bubble, moral turpitude of executives,
unethical accountants, non-audit services, and related "ills." We have argued that the inher-
ent con°ict of interest in the auditor-client relationship and the unobservability of ¯nancial
statement quality are the likely culprits. Bubbles and exuberance merely magnify the payo®s
so that executives are more tempted to "cook the books" and the auditors' con°ict of interest
is aggravated. Financial Statement Insurance, as developed here, provides a market-based
solution that acts as an e®ective check on the issuance of overly biased ¯nancial statements.
First, by transferring the auditor hiring decision to the insurer, FSI eliminates the audi-
tors' inherent con°ict of interest. Second, the publication of the insurance coverage and
the premium will credibly signal the quality of the insured's ¯nancial statements and direct
investments toward better projects. At the same time, the ability to signal the quality of
¯nancial statements will provide companies with incentives to improve the quality of their
¯nancial statements. Hence, FSI will result in fewer misrepresentations and, accordingly, in
fewer suits and stakeholder losses.
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Under the present regime, auditors' legal liability is not an e®ective tool for inducing
truth telling in ¯nancial statements because the costs of such liability are essentially covered
by the clients. As mentioned, the FSI scheme e®ectively eliminates the con°ict of interest
that came to light in the aftermath of Enron. Yet ¯nancial statement insurance has other
important bene¯ts: the credible signaling of ¯nancial statement quality and a consequent
improvement of such quality, the decrease in shareholder losses, and the better channeling
of savings to socially desirable projects. This solution can be complemented and reinforced
by GAAP reforms, resulting in signi¯cant additional indirect bene¯ts. If implemented, FSI
would facilitate an accounting approach based on underlying principles rather than detailed
rules, akin to UK GAAP. The current U.S. model encourages corporate o±cers to view
accounting rules as analogous to the Tax Code, with detailed speci¯c rules.
Traditionally, detailed rules have been championed because they enhance credibility. Uni-
form application decreases the ambiguity of results and variation in reported numbers.
Hence, it enhances comparability and possibly decreases audit costs (by minimizing dis-
putes with clients about accounting choices). Yet detailed rules also decrease the °exibility
of management in making accounting choices and thus limit its ability to signal expecta-
tions about the prospects of the company that are not shared by the public. If discretion is
accorded the manager over which accounting methods to apply in a particular instance, he
will, if he wishes to report honestly, employ methods that best re°ect the "economic reality"
of the company. Restricting his choice by imposing detailed rules reduces his ability to con-
vey truthful information if he is so inclined. Along with the °exibility, therefore, incentives
should be aligned to elicit truthful information from management. Adopting a "softer" view
of GAAP similar to the UK model would allow auditors to report a "true and fair view"
of an enterprise rather than merely attesting to whether GAAP rules were followed. Of
course, more °exibility can be abused, unless auditors' incentives are properly aligned, as in
34
FSI. Hence, FSI facilitates the adoption of a principles approach. The basis for this already
exist in the seven concepts that now constitute the FASB's Conceptual Framework. These
concepts articulate the objectives of ¯nancial statements and o®er criteria for measurement
and reporting that are designed to satisfy the objectives.
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Appendix 1
Proof of Proposition 4
Let !2 > !1, that is, p(ij!2)=p(ij!1) is increasing in realized type i. Suppose that ¼f < ¼ and
the o®-equilibrium beliefs after observing ¼f are such that !2 is indi®erent between choosing
¼ or ¼f . We will show that !1 would then strictly prefer to choose ¼f .
Noting that the lowest report j = 1 necessarily implies that the ¯rm's rate of return is
the lowest possible, r1, FP (j = 1j¼f ) = FP (j = 1j¼) = F ¤(r1). Therefore, denoting the
FSQ choice of the !2 ¯rm by xf , the indi®erence assumption on !2 leads to:
FP (1j¼f)p(1j!2xf)+FP (2j!2; ¼f )p(2j!2;xf ) = FP (1j¼; !2)p(1j!2;x)+FP (2j!2; ¼)p(2j!2;x)
(15)
Rearranging and using the facts that: (i) FP (1j¼f) = FP (1j¼) = F ¤(r1) and (ii) p(2j!j;x) =
1¡ p(1j!j;x) we obtain:
FP (2j¼f)p(2j!2;xf )¡ FP (2j¼)p(2j!2;x) = F ¤(r1) [p(1j!2;x)¡ p(1j!2;xf)]
FP (2j¼f)p(2j!2;xf )¡ FP (2j¼)p(2j!2;x) = F ¤(r1) [p(2j!2;xf)¡ p(2j!2;x)]
() FP (2j¼f )p(2j!2;xf )¡ FP (2j¼)p(2j!2;x)
[p(2j!2;xf )¡ p(2j!2;x)] = F
¤(r1)
() FP (2j¼f ) + [FP (2j¼f )¡ FP (2j¼)] p(2j!2;x)
[p(2j!2;xf )¡ p(2j!2;x)] = F
¤(r1) (16)
We note ¯rst that as FP (2j¼f ) > FP (1j¼f ) = F ¤(r1) and p(2j!2;xf ) > p(2j!2;x), Equation
(16) can only hold if FP (2j¼f ) < FP (2j¼). From the fact that p(jj!l;xf ) = Pi p(jji;xf )p(ij!l),
it follows that:
p(2j!1;xf)
p(2j!1;x) =
p(2ji = 2;xf )p(i = 2j!1) + p(2ji = 1;xf)p(i = 1j!1)
p(2ji = 2;x)p(i = 2j!1) + p(2ji = 1;x)p(i = 1j!1)
=
p(i = 2j!1) + p(2ji = 1;xf )p(i = 1j!1)
p(i = 2j!1) + p(2ji = 1;x)p(i = 1j!1)
=
1 + p(2ji = 1;xf)p(i=1j!1)p(i=2j!1)
1 + p(2ji = 1;x)p(i=1j!1)
p(i=2j!1)
(17)
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The analogous equation for !2 yields:
p(2j!2;xf)
p(2j!2;x) =
1 + p(2ji = 1;xf )p(i=1j!2)p(i=2j!2)
1 + p(2ji = 1;x)p(i=1j!2)
p(i=2j!2)
(18)
Comparing the quantities on the right-sides of Equations (17) and (18)and using the facts :
p(i = 1j!2)
p(i = 2j!2) <
p(i = 1j!1)
p(i = 2j!1) ; and p(2ji = 1;xf ) > p(2ji = 1;x)
we infer that:
p(2j!1;xf)
p(2j!1;x) >
p(2j!2;xf)
p(2j!2;x)
=) p(2j!1;xf)
p(2j!1;x) ¡ 1 >
p(2j!2;xf)
p(2j!2;x) ¡ 1
It follows that:
p(2j!1;xf )¡ p(2j!1;x)
p(2j!1;x) >
p(2j!2;xf )¡ p(2j!2;x)
p(2j!2;x)
=) p(2j!1;x)
p(2j!1;xf )¡ p(2j!1;x) <
p(2j!2;x)
p(2j!2;xf )¡ p(2j!2;x) (19)
Therefore:
FP (2j¼f ) + [FP (2j¼f )¡ FP (2j¼)]
"
p(2j!1;x)
p(2j!1;xf )¡ p(2j!1;x)
#
> FP (2j¼f ) + [FP (2j¼f )¡ FP (2j¼)]
"
p(2j!2;x)
p(2j!2;xf )¡ p(2j!2;x)
#
= FP (2j¼f ) + [FP (2j¼f )¡ FP (2j¼)] p(2j!2;x)
[p(2j!2;xf )¡ p(2j!2;x)] = F
¤(r1) (20)
But (20) and (19) together show that:
FP (2j¼f)p(2j!1;xf )¡ FP (2j¼)p(2j!1;x) > F ¤(r1) [p(2j!1;xf )¡ p(2j!1;x)] (21)
This establishes that if the !2 ¯rm is indi®erent between staying at ¼ or defecting to ¼f ,
the !1 ¯rm strictly prefers defecting to ¼f and setting FSQ xf (see Equation (16)). It is of
course possible that xf may not be the best choice of FSQ for !1 along the ¼f isoquant { but
any superior choice would only increase the funding probability (without increasing the cost
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because it also lies on the ¼f -isoquant) making it even better to defect to the o®-equilibrium
choice ¼f . Therefore, by the divinity criterion, only the lowest !-type actually is believed to
be at the o®-equilibrium premium ¼f , i.e., the equilibrium of Proposition 3 is the only one
that meets the divinity o®-equilibrium test.
When L ¸ 3, the uniqueness of the equilibrium in meeting the divinity test can be established
if the equilibrium funding probabilities have the following characteristic:
Assumption 3 (Inferences and Quality)
Let ~º, ~¹ denote investor beliefs where ºk > ¹k for every k. That is, under ~º, investors
believe that every ¯rm chooses a higher quality than under ~¹. Then investors are more
discriminating under ~º than under ~¹ as described below. For any two reports j ¸ k the
inferred returns satisfy:
E[rjj; ~º]¡ E[rjk; ~º] > E[rjj; ~¹]¡E[rjk; ~¹] (22)
The condition in Equation 22 states that under beliefs of uniformly lower quality, the inferred
rates of return change less sharply in the report. In other words, if investors believe that
FSQ of every ¯rm is lower, they place less reliance on ¯nancial reports. This is an intuitive
economic condition and ought to hold quite generally. However, the derivation of (22) from
the information structure of Assumptions 1 and 2 presents technical di±culties.
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Appendix 2 
The FSI Process 
 
The FSI underwriting procedure starts with a review of the potential insured. The 
review is performed, on behalf of the FSI carrier, by an expert risk assessor, who 
investigates the nature of conditions such as the following: 
• The nature, stability, degree of competition, and general economic health of 
the industries in which the potential insured operates. 
• The reputation, integrity, operating philosophy, financial state, and prior 
operating results of the potential insured’s management. 
• The nature, age, size, and operating structure of the potential insured. 
• The potential insured’s control environment and significant management 
and accounting policies, practices, and methods. 
The process involves five sequential steps: 
 
Step 1—The potential insured requests an insurance proposal from the FSI 
carrier.  The proposal contains, at a minimum, the maximum amount of 
insurance being offered and the related premium.  Typically, it also specifies a 
schedule of amounts of coverage below the maximum along with associated 
premiums.  The proposal request is made prior to the preparation of the 
potential insured’s shareholders’ proxy on the basis of the underwriting review 
described above.  The reviewer can be the same auditor who will eventually 
audit the financial statements. 
 
Step 2—The proxy offers the following alternatives: 
o The maximum amount of insurance and related premium as 
offered in the insurance proposal. 
o The amount of insurance and related premium recommended by 
management. 
o No insurance 
 
Step 3—If either of the insurance options set forth in Step 2 is approved, then 
the reviewer and the auditor cooperatively plan the scope and depth of the audit 
to be conducted.  
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Step 4—If, after the audit, the auditor is in the position of rendering a clean 
opinion, the policy is issued.  That is, the originally proposed coverage and 
premium will be binding on the insurance carrier if the auditor’s opinion turns 
out to be clean.  If the auditor’s opinion is qualified the insurer will not provide 
any coverage unless the company can then renegotiate different terms with the 
insurer, which would depend on the auditor’s findings and reasons for 
qualification.  To the extent the policy terms are renegotiated, the new agreed-
upon terms would be publicized. 
 
Step 5—The auditor’s opinion will contain a paragraph disclosing the amount of 
insurance that covers the accompanying financial statements and the associated 
premium. 
 
Figure 1 below depicts the sequence of the steps required in the implementation and 
Figure 2 shows the inter-relationships among the various parties participating in the 
insurance mechanism and the roles they play.    
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Figure 1 
The FSI Process 
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Figure 2 
Relationships Among the Parties 
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